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Professor of Law Professor in Policy Studies
Columbia Law School Queen's University (Ontario)
THE REAL JEWEL IN THE WTO's CROWN
TRANSPARENCY OBLIGATIONS HAVE UNDERGONE SUBSTANTIAL transformations
since the inception of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 117
1947. From an obligation to publish general laws affecting trade, the system now
includes peer review by governments (in the form of monitoring and surveillance)
and efforts to inform the public. These accomplishments are remarkable, but
much remains to be done. Originally designed for a handful of developed
countries, the global trading system now must provide an expanded knowledge
base that benefits 160 member states, millions of economic actors, and hundreds
of millions of citizens with inadequate resources to acquire information on their
own. But that knowledge base remains incomplete.
The role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) is often thought to
be twofold-conducting formal rounds of negotiations and resorting to the
dispute settlement system-but the third dimension of its work, which can be
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broadly grouped as transparency and accountability mechanisms, may be the
most important. Transparency is part of the WTO's DNA, and can be traced at
least through the 1947 GATT back to a 1923 treaty on customs cooperation.
This essential element of WTO institutional design illuminates trade policy
practices to the benefit of both governments and traders. The WTO's twentieth
anniversary is an appropriate moment to describe the impressive evolution of
its transparency mechanisms, assess the effectiveness of these mechanisms, and
reflect on what more must be done if the WTO is to fulfill its potential as the
central institution for governing the global trading system.
The first use of sunshine as a metaphor for transparency as a policy tool is
attributed to the U.S. jurist Louis Brandeis. In writing about efforts to regulate
finance, Brandeis stated, "Publicity is justly commended as a remedy for social
and industrial diseases. Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants; electric
light the most efficient policeman."'
The Brandeis view assumes that agents whose actions are subject to public
scrutiny will hew more closely to shared understandings of the common good.
If not, other agents provided with information can exercise appropriate disci-
pline. In this view of agency, sunlight contributes more to social order than does
coercion. Sunlight plays this role in the trading system by reducing information
118 asymmetries. If the goal of trade agreements is to have binding commitments
reduce the policy uncertainty that would otherwise afflict trade relations, then
the credibility of those commitments matters. Transparency ought to improve
the operation of the trading system by allowing all members to verify that na-
tional law, policy, and implementation achieve the objective of the agreements.
The drafters of the GATT assumed that publication of trade laws alone
was sufficient. Over time, however, participants in the trading system gradu-
ally learned that a more active form of publication was needed to draw relevant
information to the attention of other governments in the form of notifications
through the Secretariat.2 By the 1970s, it was becoming clear that governments
needed a forum to discuss such notifications; in 1980, the GATT Council began
a biannual review of notifications.3 Neither that review nor the notifications
themselves, however, provided enough information. The Uruguay Round agree-
ments created a much more elaborate structure of committees, with a working
group on how to make the many new notification requirements work.
Creating opportunities to discuss new measures in advance of their imple-
mentation can reduce the potential for conflict between states. For example, when
a measure is modified to accommodate the interests of partners, economic actors
only have time to adjust if the information is available to them. The original
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GATT transparency system assumed that the primary agents were government
officials in developed countries and traders with the sophistication to make use of
published information. The picture changed dramatically over the years as more
and more countries joined the GATT/WTO, expanding membership from the
original 23 countries to today's 160, and the amount of trade-relevant regulation
proliferated. Less than 10 years after the creation of the WTO, members had
already concluded that further action was needed to make information available
to developing countries, the public, and economic actors.
We first examine the evolution of the transparency discipline within the
world trading system, before performing a reality check and discussing whether
the transparency obligations have been observed. Next, we suggest that trade
policy information is a public good, one that will be under-provided to both
traders and smaller members without stronger incentives and/or disciplines. We
conclude with three proposals for the optimal future evolution of the transpar-
ency obligation.
The paper proposes a stronger role for the WTO Secretariat as a common
agent for all participants in the trading system by providing more and more
focused sunshine on global trade.
THREE GENERATIONS OF TRANSPARENCY 119
WTO transparency has evolved through three generations. The first generation
refers to the original GATT policies on information from 1947 as elaborated
over the years. The second generation refers to the monitoring and surveillance
mechanisms, introduced with the conclusion of the Tokyo Round negotiations
in 1979 and enhanced in the Uruguay Round negotiations, that led to the
creation of the WTO in 1995. The third generation refers both to managing
an enlarged WTO with 160 members and to greater openness to the public,
facilitated by the emergence of the Internet, especially after a 2002 decision on
access to documents.
FIRST-GENERATION TEETHING PRoBLEMS
Most first-generation WTO transparency provisions relate to the obligations
incumbent on governments for trade policy transparency at home. This principle
is first seen in Article X of the GATT on "Publication and Administration of
Trade Regulations," but it is now found in many other WTO agreements.
Publication, which remains essential, proved to have at least two limitations.
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First, publication is restricted to "laws of general application"-a sensible
decision, since otherwise a cost would be imposed on WTO members to provide
information that might be of little use to traders.' Disputes have arisen, and
continue to arise, about what "general application" means, which is one of the
WTO members have consistently pre- reasons why close to 10 percent
of all WTO disputes concern
ferred to be parsimonious about what GATT Article X. Such com-
they publish, since some of the informa- plaints often concern inconsis-
provided could be self-incriminating. tent administration of domestic
customs procedures, including,
for example, a complaint by the United States in EC-Selected Customs Mat-
ters (DS315). WTO members have consistently preferred to be parsimonious
about what they publish, since some of the information provided could be
self-incriminating.
Second, though the obligation emphasizes unveiling information in a
publicly available form, procurement of that information can nonetheless be
costly. Most traders are helped, for example, by information about subsidies
published in a local newspaper that is not in a official WTO language. Publica-
tion at home does not necessarily mean that other members of the WTO are
120 notified. The only significant GATT notification requirements are in Article
XVI, which requires notification of subsidies, and Article XXIV, which requires
notification regarding free trade agreements (FTAs).'
FROM PUBLICATION TO NOTIFICATION
Notification obligations began to expand in the 1980s as the new Tokyo Round
obligations took the GATT "behind the border," by creating new obligations
pertaining to measures applied to both domestic as well as imported products
that had been cleared through customs. Until then, the focus had been on
measures at the border that hit only imports, but the remarkable reduction
of the level of tariffs allowed traders to better understand the bite of domestic
policies and persuaded them that it was high time they were rationalized. This
type of discipline further expanded with the advent of the WTO in 1995.
Publication at home is barely enough when most trade measures have their
effects at the border. To encourage submission of information, members agreed
in one of the decisions adopted with the creation of the WTO that notification
was without prejudice to whether a measure was consistent with the member's
WTO obligations.7 They established a Central Registry of Notifications to
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receive and maintain notifications, to inform each member annually of its regular
notification obligations, and to draw the attention of individual members to
regular notification requirements that remain unfulfilled. By 2011, the central
database covered 176 notification requirements, of which 42 were recurring
requirements on a semiannual, annual, biennial, or triennial basis.8 This number
has increased with the new Trade Facilitation Agreement.
Notification is one leg of second-generation obligations, the other being
the establishment of monitoring and surveillance mechanisms. Members review
each other's implementation of the agreements in the various WTO committees,
often with an opportunity to ask each other questions about their respective
notifications. The Agriculture Committee, for example, devotes a significant part
of each regular meeting to reviewing notifications that range from information
regarding the level of export subsidies paid to the adoption of policies concern-
ing environmental protection.9 The Committee on Regional Trade Agreements'
(CRTA) Transparency Mechanism allows discussion of notification of new
regional trade agreements (RTAs) to expose the potentially negative aspects of
an RTA without requiring members to give it formal approval."o Peer review of
the ensemble of a country's trade policy, but not consideration of specific obliga-
tions, is also found in the Trade Policy Review Mechanism (TPRM). Discussion
there is based on major reports written both by the WTO Secretariat and the
member under review."
The most elaborate monitoring and surveillance mechanism is now known
as the specific trade concerns (STC) procedure in the Sanitary and Phyto-sanitary
Measures and Technical Barriers to Trade committees. WTO members can in-
formally challenge the consistency of notified measures by raising an STC; if the
member is not satisfied with the responses given, it can raise a formal dispute
by requesting consultations in the dispute settlement system with the member
that had adopted the challenged measure. 12 The term is not mentioned in the
text of any WTO agreement, although many agreements encourage a process
in which members may engage in ad hoc consultations on their notification of
new trade measures, and others, notably the Agriculture Committee, also now
have an online database of matters raised in the committee.
INTO THE GREAT WIDE OPEN
Third-generation transparency focuses on the efficiency of procuring information.
The Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) Agreement is the front-runner here. It
requires the establishment of inquiry points, where private traders can seek
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information from a foreign government about the workings of technical
regulations. Traders therefore do not have to depend on their own government
for this information, and other governments, too, will receive similar information
in the TBT Committee. Inquiry points are the first step toward creating a so-
called "single window" for trading information in each member state, thus
reducing the search costs of information procurement. In a similar vein, the
WTO's new Integrated Trade Intelligence Portal (I-TIP) provides a single entry
point for information compiled by the WTO on trade policy measures. I-TIP
covers both tariff and non-tariff measures affecting trade in goods as well as
information on trade in services, trade in government procurement markets,
regional trade agreements, and the accession commitments of WTO members.
This transparency system looks good on paper, but does it work?
REALYTY CHECK
The evolution of the GATT/WTO transparency system through three
generations of increasing complexity and sophistication has created a window
into the trading system, but that window is often clouded. The Central Registry
system with its detailed annual reports is both essential and frustrating because
122 only experts can make sense of the data. More valuable is the section of the
periodic Trade Policy Review (TPR) reports on each country that details their
notification performance.13 But this kind of naming and shaming, which also
takes place in some committees, has not led to a large increase in notifications.
We see four potential reasons why governments do not improve notifica-
tion. The first is bureaucratic incapacity, which is the case for many developing
countries whose trade ministries lack data or knowledge, for example about a
subsidy granted by another ministry. Second, member states might worry about
opening themselves to criticism in a dispute-perhaps about a measure that
Many officials report a lack of trust they suspect is illegal, or about
a notification that might require
between trade negotiators and other showing one's cards in a negotia-
government agencies in state capitals. tion. Third, many officials report
a lack of trust between trade
negotiators and other government agencies in state capitals, which is said to
be more significant than any lack of trust in Geneva; officials responsible for a
regulation affecting public health may see no need to explain themselves to the
trade negotiators. This lack of trust inhibits the ability of trade officials to gather
information for notification of domestic policies, which are the policies where
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notification is most valuable. Fourth, there is ambiguity about what exactly to
notify. Case law, as cited above, has interpreted "law of general application" as
tantamount to measures that are not transaction-specific. This interpretation
mightbeenoughwhenwedeal In practice then, the only discipline
with the imposition of duties on
one particular shipment (that exacted toward those who violate
would not be characterized as a transparency obligations is, in fact, trans-
law of general application) but
insffcintooterccaios;parency. We argue that more is needed.insufficie t on other occasions,
for example, when an antidumping duty is imposed, since similar duties might
or might not cover specific transactions. Similar ambiguities concern the under-
standing of the term "subsidy," since it is often difficult to understand whether
a benefit, for example, has been bestowed. The antisubsidy counterfactual is
often difficult to establish.
In the latest in a long series of such efforts, the chairperson of the General
Council wrote to the chairs of all WTO bodies in February 2009 asking them
to consult with members on ways to improve the timeliness and completeness
of notifications and other information flows on trade measures. The subsequent
annual overview of the trading system by the Director-General contained a new
section on transparency, repeated every year year.' 4 This section revealed that
many of the required notifications are late, incomplete, or never submitted at all.
No committee has a perfect record, although some are better than others. The
record of notification of industrial subsidies is especially poor." While many of
the poor performers are small countries of little overall significance in the trading
system, some of the recalcitrant are among the largest traders. In April 2013, the
chair of the Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM) Committee listed
the 71 members that had not made 2011 notifications, which included four of
the top 30 merchandise exporters: China, Indonesia, Thailand, and the United
Arab Emirates.' 6 The excuses offered included technical and capacity constraints
as well as coordination difficulties.
A related problem is the inability or unwillingness of many members to
use second-generation transparency mechanisms by asking questions in com-
mittees. The nearly 900 questions asked in the SCM committee from 2008 to
2012 were asked by only 16 members, all but two of whom are G-20 countries,
although the questions were posed to 58 members (counting the EU as one in
both cases). This reticence may be a manifestation of the glass house syndrome:
some members might be afraid to ask a question, since doing so might provoke
questions about their own behavior. Alternatively, members might not ask ques-
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tions because they do not see the value of either notification or surveillance.
Violations of transparency obligations are, like any other form of noncom-
pliance, justiciable. Under the de facto system of prospective remedies adopted by
WTO panels, members that have failed in their obligation to disclose information
need only notify the WTO ex post facto. An illustrative case is the Trondheim
litigation, in which Norway had failed to respect its transparency obligations
under the Government Procurement Agreement.17 The United States, after
discovering Norway's failure to comply with transparency obligations, prevailed
in the subsequent GATT dispute but had to be content with a Pyrrhic victory.
All that the panel requested from Norway was a promise never to repeat this
behavior. In practice then, the only discipline exacted toward those who violate
transparency obligations is, in fact, transparency. We argue that more is needed.
EMPOWERMENT OF THE COMMON AGENT
The objective of WTO transparency is not only to reduce information
asymmetries among governments, but also those among the state, economic
actors, and citizens. Article X. 1 of the GATT requires publication of certain
trade policy information for the benefit of both governments and traders.
124 Article X.3 requires the creation of independent administrative law tribunals to
allow prompt adjudication of customs matters. More recent WTO agreements
go further in specifying domestic administrative law requirements. While the
WTO is primarily thought of as a contract among governments, its rules are
also meant to serve traders. The rights of private parties under the Government
Procurement Agreement and the obligation to establish inquiry points under
the TBT Agreement and Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) go in the same direction; these are obligations
aiming to benefit private agents directly, rather than WTO members. The WTO's
differing objectives create a trilemma: the surveillance system is designed to
monitor official obligations on behalf of governments. Citizens and analysts,
however, are more interested in the economic or social impact of policy, not the
implementation of commitments. Traders are only served if governments publish
information at home and if all WTO data is accessible in user-friendly form. In
short, everyone needs more information, and they need efficient access to it, but
their needs are not being met by the current system. Trade policy information
is a public good, especially for traders and for smaller member states. Like all
public goods, this information tends to be underprovided. We first explore the
missing incentives in the system before proposing a solution.
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WHOSE AGENCY?
It is by now commonplace to treat information as a commodity. There are
undeniable search costs when trying to unearth information, and some agents
cannot bear them. Developing countries in the WTO-which are typically
poor-profit considerably Trade policy information is a public good,
from transparency, since
procuring information is especially for traders and for smaller
more costly for them. They member states. Like all public goods,
export small numbers of this information tends to underprovided.
goods and services to few
countries, and they lack a large diplomatic network of officials gathering
commercial information abroad. Similarly, smaller traders lack in-house trade
intelligence capacity and cannot afford to procure it from big multinational
law firms.
When it comes to honoring their transparency obligations, WTO members
seem to more often than not emphasize their right to divulge or not divulge,
focusing less on the consequence of this exercise of discretion-which is that
others may be limited in their right to know about measures affecting trade.
Moreover, one should not underestimate the collective action problem that arises,
even for large members. For instance, why should the United States incur the
cost of procuring information through reverse notifications when all members
will benefit from the information revealed? The United States has submitted
extensive reverse notifications of Chinese and Indian subsidies, but few other
members have the capacity to generate such analysis of another member's poli-
cies. The United States might also have an incentive in similar situations to
keep information to itself rather than serving the general good with a reverse
notification or a detailed question in a committee.
Given the missing incentives to notify, one solution might be to cut through
the trilemma by enabling a disinterested party to acquire and disseminate infor-
mation as the common agent of all participants in the trading system.
WHAT HAPPENS ALREADY
Our analysis shows that small countries and small firms in particular need more
support from the WTO in terms of supplying transparency regarding their own
policies. The Secretariat has some capacity to act as the common agent of the
members; this role should be enhanced. The WTO has multiple principals- 160
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member governments, but also citizens and hundreds of millions of traders.
Sunshine as now practiced does not properly enable these agents to discipline
other agents who may not be playing by the rules. In order to ensure such
discipline is possible, two things are required, both of which can only come
from a common agent: active efforts to 1) increase the amount of information
available; and 2) make that information widely available in a useful way. The
move toward increasing the role of the WTO Secretariat is the implicit response
to the failure of WTO members to submit notifications.
The core of each TPR report is based on the notifications from members,
but each report builds on a far wider range of information. The Secretariat col-
lects data from official sources, which include questionnaires to members under
review, and non-official sources, including other international organizations,
media reports, and NGOs. To ensure accuracy, the Secretariat seeks to verify
data that comes from non-official sources when discussing the draft of its report
with the members.18
Members created a new mechanism in response to the Great Recession
that began in 2008. After the G-20 asked the WTO and other international
organizations to monitor their collective commitment to avoid protectionism,
the WTO began issuing periodic crisis-monitoring reports. These reports are
126 a novel extension of the mandate of the Trade Policy Review Body, that is, the
WTO organ administering the functioning of TPRM." The Director-General
claimed that he had the authority under the WTO agreements to conduct the
crisis monitoring, but members only formalized this role in December 2011 20
Members had discovered that the periodic Secretariat reports were factual and
useful, especially for smaller members that could not begin to generate such
data on their own, and that the Secretariat was not trying to add to the dispute
settlement system through the back door.2 1
The Secretariat can only do so much, however. It too faces search costs and
has limited power of naming and shaming.
A LOOK INTO THE FUTURE
Transparency cannot have the same content for WTO members as for individual
traders. Irrespective of whether we talk about customs matters, technical
barriers to trade, or government procurement, the intensity of information
should be different. Traders do not possess sophisticated bureaucracies that
will process supplied information for them. One would not expect that small
and medium enterprises would have in-house lawyers, for example, who will
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process information regarding measures in export markets in a systematic
manner in order to assess their consistency. The potential usefulness of similar
investment for traders would by far outweigh its costs for the WTO. The level of
disaggregation should be different when information is meant to accustom traders
to trade policies. We see a role for the WTO as the common agent to supply
information when it is undersupplied. In effect, the Secretariat can function as
a complement in Geneva to the development of the single window for certain
kinds of information in capitals. We would like to see three innovations that
would support the changing role that the WTO ought to play in international
trade relations.
First, the Secretariat should be more proactive in collecting information and
making it available, which would require some internal reorganization of the staff
and most likely some additional investment as well. The inadequate notifications
by WTO members can be partially mitigated by giving the Secretariat increased
scope and resources to act as the common agent of members. In this role, the
Secretariat would assemble information that ought to have been disseminated
through notifications. This authority should be subject to the principle that any
information collected in this way should be verified by members.
Second, the Secretariat should keep a data set with the number of noti-
fications in general and by agreement for each WTO member for a five-year 127
period. If in any year a given WTO member is below the mean, either for the
membership as a whole or for members at a similar stage of development, then
WTO officials would target that member on a priority basis. Similarly, if im-
portant developments occur and there is no upward deviation from the mean
number of notifications, then again this WTO member should be reviewed on
a priority basis.
Third, as the common agent, the Secretariat needs to pay special attention
to collecting ongoing information about the operation of regional or preferential
trade agreements (PTAs). The WTO is not the only game in town, as over 500
regional trade schemes have been established and some mega-regional schemes are
in the works. We know little, if anything, about the workings of those schemes
after their review by the CRTA has been completed. Yet, these agreements are
full ofTBT+, SPS+, and GPA+ disciplines, which at least potentially affect each
and every WTO member and trader.22 A bridge must be built to ensure a steady
flow of information about the operation of PTAs. Such exercise of transparency
and dissemination matters for PTA participants themselves because most such
agreements have weak institutional structures, no strong notification obligations,
and no Secretariat to process notifications in any case.
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SUNSHINE REQUIRES A STRONGER LENS
Justice Brandeis might have overstated the efficiency of sunshine, but he certainly
did not overstate the case for transparency. The work of Nobel Prize-winning
economists, such as George Akerlof, Joseph Stiglitz, Michael Spence, and Oliver
E. Williamson, demonstrates that information should be treated like all other
scarce commodities. Information, after all, is costly and not equally accessible.
Transparency obligations aim to equalize conditions of procuring information
across all trading nations and their traders, assuming fair play by all. In the case
of international trade, where almost all government intervention affects the trade
outcome in one way or the other, the quest for equalizing access to information
is also a quest for efficient access to information. It does not help traders much
to say that information is available if they do not also know where it is available.
We see a need to strengthen the existing disciplinary measures and to expand
the role for the WTO to act as a lens-by helping to shine a more focused light
where it is needed. Many more actors will then be able to obtain the information
necessary for disciplining the few who try to restrict trade at the expense of the
many. It is high time that the WTO addresses the oft-forgotten inconvenient
truth: the WTO is a government-to-government contract that affects the lives of
128 individual traders. In this vein, we recommend a more active role for the WTO
Secretariat and a wider use of the information provided.
As more developing countries participate in global value chains and as
micro-firms in all countries participate in rapidly expanding Internet-enabled
trade, a much wider group of economic actors will figure prominently in global
trade. The issue of information asymmetry will therefore become exponentially
more complex. No PTA can create the apparatus necessary to solve this problem.
The WTO can provide such information, but only with an expanded role for
the Secretariat as a common agent to collect, aggregate, and disseminate trade
policy intelligence. 0
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